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Abstract: Industrial energy conservation programs in China form a cornerstone of China’s energy and 
environmental management efforts, engaging thousands of major energy‑using enterprises, and targeting 
hundreds of million tons of annual coal‑equivalent energy savings during the Eleventh and Twelfth Five‑Year 
Plans (2006 to 2015). An important question in China and other developing countries is to understand 
how compliance systems develop and perform, especially in settings where regulators have limited prior 
experience and resources to support evaluation and enforcement. We use detailed, newly‑released compliance 
reports, combined with industrial census data on participating firms, to identify the drivers of compliance 
at the firm level. We find evidence consistent with manipulation of reported compliance data during the 
Eleventh Five‑Year Plan (2006–2010), but not during the expanded program under the Twelfth Five‑Year 
Plan (2011–2015). We show that the non‑compliance rate increased with the expansion of the program, 
and publicly‑reported reasons for non‑compliance vary widely. We find that firms that are large, and new 
program entrants, as well as firms in cities with low growth exhibit higher non‑compliance rates after program 
expansion. Our findings demonstrate that although expanding coverage increases potential energy savings, 
regulators must grapple with increased heterogeneity in firms’ internal energy‑saving opportunities and 
capabilities as well as in the degree of external accountability to regulators. Introducing a market for energy 
saving or CO2 emissions may help to solve the problem of uneven abatement costs, but differences in the 
strength of accountability relationships could undermine performance. 
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1. Introduction
Limiting the energy and environmental footprint of in‑
dustrial firms in rapidly emerging nations is a high‑stakes 
governance challenge. Despite the large projected bene‑
fits, enforcement of environmental policies remains un‑
even. In many parts of the world, government programs 
assign cleanup targets to industrial firms responsible 
for generating pollution, engaging various levels of the 
administrative hierarchy in design and implementation. 
Given the prevalence of these programs, there is a need 
to understand how policy originates within and is en‑
forced by the governing organization, what determines 
enterprise‑level compliance, and whether or not changes 
to policy design could improve outcomes. 
A recent effort to make detailed firm‑level compliance 
data available for a flagship industrial energy saving 
initiative in China offers a unique opportunity to study 
these governance questions. Compared to other na‑
tions, China’s large and diverse industrial sector makes 
the country a leading source of energy use, air pollu‑
tion, and climate‑warming greenhouse gases. In terms 
of coverage and government resources invested, the ini‑
tiative’s two installments—known as the Top 1,000 and 
Top 10,000 Enterprises Energy‑Saving Programs—were 
the most ambitious efforts to raise the efficiency of in‑
dustrial firms ever launched in China. Initiated by the 
central government, the program engaged cadres across 
all levels of government in the administration of the pro‑
gram. Funds were made available to participating firms 
to raise energy efficiency through adoption of technolo‑
gy and process changes, contingent on detailed plans for 
achieving energy saving targets. Government resources 
invested in the program are difficult to estimate precisely, 
but account for a significant share of the total industrial 
energy conservation investment of about 100 billion U.S. 
dollars during the 12th Five‑Year Plan (Ministry of Indus‑
try and Information Technology, 2012). 
China’s energy conservation programs are part of a 
multi‑layered effort to increase oversight of the energy 
system and environmental protection. The Top 1,000 and 
Top 10,000 Enterprises Programs were designed to sup‑
port the implementation of mandatory energy‑intensity 
targets at the national and provincial levels. As designed, 
the Top 1,000 Enterprises Program was expected to de‑
liver 10% to 25% of China’s national energy‑saving target 
for the Eleventh Five‑Year Plan period (Price et al., 2010), 
and was later estimated to have delivered much more. The 
total energy saving achieved by the Top 10,000 Enterprises 
Program has not been announced at the time of writing, 
but the energy saving in the first four years (2011–2014) 
has already surpassed the targeted five‑year energy saving. 
While participation in both programs was essential‑
ly voluntary (e.g. there were no financial penalties for 
non‑compliance), in practice a firm’s ownership status 
determined the strength and channels of accountabili‑
ty. For state‑owned enterprises, energy saving achieve‑
ments were included in cadre performance evaluations, 
part of an extensive range of criteria used to assess the 
performance of government officials and SOE leaders. 
Non‑state firms were not subject to such evaluations. 
In many respects, given the widespread reliance on the 
personnel evaluation system in enforcing a broad range 
of policies, studying firm responses to China’s energy 
conservation programs provides insight into China’s en‑
vironmental policy enforcement and the origins of an 
“implementation gap” that has been documented since 
the 1990s (Chan et al., 1995). 
Here we evaluate China’s energy‑saving programs on mul‑
tiple dimensions. Section 2 describes the Top 1,000 and 
Top 10,000 Enterprises Programs and summarizes firm 
compliance behavior. Section 3 examines the relationship 
between pre‑existing firm characteristics and policy com‑
pliance and identifies predictors of non‑compliance behav‑
ior. Section 4 discusses the challenges of moving from com‑
mand‑and‑control to market‑based approaches for energy 
saving and emissions reduction. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Energy Saving Programs in the Context 
of China's Environmental Policy
The determinants of environmental policy compliance 
among China’s firms has been widely studied. Multiple 
studies conduct detailed reviews of one or both energy 
conservation programs (Zhou et al., 2010; Price et al., 
2010; Ke et al., 2012; Lu et al., 2014) and find them effec‑
tive and important for achieving China’s national energy 
intensity reduction goals. These studies belong to a broad 
and rich literature aimed at explaining variation in the 
enforcement of China’s energy and environmental poli‑
cy, which includes Kostka and Hobbs (2012) for energy 
efficiency, Santalco (2012) for renewable energy, Schreif‑
els et al. (2012) for sulfur dioxide, and Golding (2011) 
for water. These papers, together with the environmental 
law and politics literatures (van Rooij, 2006; Wang, 2013; 
Kostka, 2016; Ran, 2009), offer insights into the determi‑
nants of policy outcomes in China based on interviews, 
case studies, and provincial or municipal level data. 
These studies have pointed to the important role of political 
campaigns (van Rooij, 2006), command‑and‑control in‑
struments such as binding environmental targets as well as 
their unintended consequences (e.g. data falsification and 
other strategic behavior) in implementation (Kostka, 2016), 
and the dual role of cadre incentives and the engagement 
of civil society (Wang, 2013) in strengthening enforcement 
behavior among local officials. However, we still know little 
about what sways the behavior of polluters themselves, and 
under what conditions firms—in this case, large energy us‑
2
MIT JOINT PROGRAM ON THE SCIENCE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL CHANGE REPORT 303
3
ers—do or do not comply with targets. Evidence of how 
firms respond to voluntary programs such as the Top 1,000 
and Top 10,000 Enterprises Programs has, to our knowl‑
edge, not been studied in the previous literature. 
The fact that the NDRC has made publicly available very 
detailed firm compliance records for the Top 1,000 and 
Top 10,000 Enterprises Programs has made the present 
inquiry possible. This level of transparency on policy 
compliance is rare in China. Using these data we are able 
to analyze firm compliance behavior by matching obser‑
vations with firm‑level information from China’s indus‑
trial census (National Bureau of Statistics, 2003–2011). 
We find that firms that are large, new program entrants, 
and firms in cities with low growth tend to fail to comply. 
We find evidence that the non‑compliance rate increases 
with the expansion of the program, both as a result of re‑
duced deliberate misreporting of compliance data and an 
increase in the effective stringency of energy saving tar‑
gets, a function of increasing marginal energy saving cost 
and target inflexibility. Our findings extend a large liter‑
ature focused on firm compliance behavior largely in de‑
veloped countries (see for example Doshi et al. (2013) on 
environmental information disclosure in the U.S., Potoski 
and Prakash (2005) on environmental regulatory initia‑
tives in the U.S., Bajo et al. (2009) on insider trading in It‑
aly, and Gunningham et al. (2004) on the voluntary odor 
control system installation in paper mills in several de‑
veloped countries). As a developing country with uneven 
contract enforcement and substantial state ownership of 
industry, China offers an important case for comparison. 
2.1 Top 1,000 and Top 10,000 Enterprises 
Programs: Structure and compliance
Starting from the Eleventh Five‑Year Plan (FYP, 
2006–2010), several government ministries and agencies 
led by the National Development and Reform Commis‑
sion (NDRC) implemented the “Top 1,000 Enterprises 
Program”, which involved 1,008 industrial firms1, ac‑
counting for about 30% of China’s total energy use in 
2005. Each firm was assigned an energy‑saving target 
for the Eleventh FYP period. According to reports, the 
program delivered a reduction of about 170 million tons 
of coal‑equivalent energy (relative to a baseline that 
1 Firms initially included in the program that closed, stopped 
production, merged, or changed production significantly were 
excluded temporarily or permanently from evaluations. Therefore, the 
total number of firms evaluated in every year was fewer than 1,008. A 
similar situation existed during the Twelfth FYP. Examples of firms 
that were temporarily excluded from the evaluations are 山西晋能集
团金光铁合金有限公司 (Shanxi Jinneng Group Jinguang Ferroalloy 
Co., Ltd.), 山西磊鑫电力硅镁有限公司 (Shanxi Leixin Electric Sili‑
con and Magnesium Co., Ltd.), and 潞城市兴宝钢铁有限责任公司 
(Lucheng Xingbao Steel Co., Ltd.), which were listed among firms that 
closed or stopped production in 2009, but re‑appeared in the 2010 
evaluation. 
assumed no change in energy intensity), contributing 
significantly to the achievement of China’s target of re‑
ducing national energy intensity by 20% by 2010 relative 
to 2005 levels. The program was expanded into the “Top 
10,000 Enterprises Program” during the Twelfth FYP 
(2011–2015), involving 14,641 industrial firms, and hun‑
dreds of transportation operators, hotels and restaurants, 
commercial and trade enterprises, and schools, in total 
16,078 institutions. Covered institutions, which account‑
ed for more than 60% of China’s total energy use in 2010, 
were required to achieve 250 million tons of coal‑equiv‑
alent energy saving, or about 650 million tons of CO2 
emissions mitigation each year (National Development 
and Reform Commission, 2011). 
Reported compliance rates for the Top 1,000 Enterpris‑
es Program during the Eleventh FYP were very high, 
but decreased in the expanded version of the program 
during the Twelfth FYP. Among the 881 firms evaluated 
at the end of the Eleventh Five‑Year Plan in 2010, there 
were only 15 firms (1.7%) that did not achieve the tar‑
get. According to three annual evaluations of the “Top 
10,000 Enterprises Programs” in 2012, 2013 and 20142, 
non‑compliance rates increased substantially (9.5% in 
2012, 8.4% in 2013 and 7.1% in 2014). 
2.2 Expanding coverage, growing 
non‑compliance
The most notable change from the Top 1,000 Enterpris‑
es Program to the Top 10,000 Enterprises Program was 
that the coverage became much broader, in terms of both 
sectors covered and total firms included. The Top 1,000 
Enterprises Program originally contained 1,008 industri‑
al firms with energy use higher than 180,000 tons of coal 
equivalent in 2004 representing nine energy‑intensive 
industrial sectors. The Top 10,000 Enterprises Program 
originally included 14,641 industrial firms with energy 
use higher than 10,000 tons of coal equivalent in 2010 
covering all industrial sectors as well as 1,437 other major 
energy users, such as transportation firms, hotels, restau‑
rants, commercial and trade enterprises, and schools. 
Given its broader coverage, the Top 10,000 Enterprises 
Program targeted a higher share (37%) of total national 
energy saving in the Five‑Year Plan than the Top 1,000 
Enterprises Program (25%). Table A1 provides a com‑
parison of the Top 1,000 Enterprises and Top 10,000 En‑
2 At the time of writing, only three reports were available for the 
“Top 10,000 Enterprises Programs”. In the first half of each year, the 
local government reported firm compliance for the previous year to 
the provincial government, and the provincial data was later summa‑
rized by NDRC. NDRC then organized on‑site checks and document 
examination in each province in the middle of the year. The results 
were then finalized and usually published at the end of the year. 
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terprises Programs3. In Table 1, we show non‑compliant 
firms and total firms evaluated by year for each program. 
Annual compliance reports for the Top 10,000 Enterpris‑
es Program only include non‑compliant firms as well as 
all SOEs, but contain no information on firms that pre‑
maturely exit the program. We are therefore only able to 
provide non‑compliance information by sector for firms 
included in the original list and for non‑compliant firms 
included in annual reports in Table 2 .4 
Table 2 shows that non‑industrial firms have higher 
non‑compliance rates than industrial firms, especially in 
2012. Interestingly, the transportation firms and schools, 
most of which are shiyedanwei, or large local SOEs, 
showed fairly high non‑compliance rates in 2012, but 
compliance greatly improved in 2013 and 2014. In gen‑
eral, these organizations seem to respond to the program. 
Overall, the non‑compliance rate for industrial firms in 
the Top 10,000 Enterprises Programs is still significantly 
higher than that of the Top 1,000 Enterprises Program. 
Since detailed sector information for industrial firms un‑
der the Top 10,000 Enterprises Program is not available, 
and the compliance reports provide no financial data, we 
match the firms using firm names and ID with a com‑
prehensive firm‑level data set (the China Industrial Cen‑
sus, CIC) that contains very detailed corporate finance 
3 All the government documents used in this paper have been 
collected from the NDRC website and will be made publicly available 
after this paper is published. 
4 We estimate the non‑compliance rate by sector by assuming that 
firms included in the original list but not in the evaluation in later 
years are all industrial firms as many firms/institutions in the other 
four sectors are large shiyedanwei (especially schools) or large local 
SOEs, and the chances of closing, stopping production, merging, or 
experiencing a significant production change are small. Here Shiyedan‑
wei (事业单位 in Chinese) refers to a special group of institutions in 
China, which are also recognized as “public institutions”. Most of them 
provide public goods or services, and employees are managed similarly 
to those in government bodies. Therefore, the noncompliance rates 
estimated for industrial firms in 2012, 2013, and 2014 are an upper 
bound on the actual rates, while the non‑compliance rates estimated 
for other organizational types represent a lower bound. The numbers 
of firms that did not achieve their target in “hotels and restaurants” and 
“commercial and trade” sectors remained almost unchanged over the 
three years, which suggests our assumption may be justified. 
information on all registered firms above 5 million RMB 
(about US $800,000)5. Table 3 shows the matching results. 
Expanding sector coverage does not fully account for 
the increase in the non‑compliance rate. Among all the 
industrial firms in the Top 10,000 Enterprises Program, 
6,945 firms were successfully matched to the 2011 CIC 
data. Of the 6,945 firms matched, 4,951 are from the 
sectors that were covered in the Top 1,000 Enterprises 
Program. Non‑compliance rate among these firms, as‑
suming all these firms did not prematurely exit the pro‑
gram in the following years, are 8.5% in 2012, 8.0% in 
2013, and 5.0% in 2014 respectively, slightly lower than 
the overall non‑compliance rate for all industrial firms. 
We further match the merged data set above with the Top 
1,000 Enterprises Program data, and find that among the 
6,945 firms, 412 firms were included in the Top 1,000 
Enterprises Program. The non‑compliance rate for these 
firms is 8.7% in 2012, 7.3% in 2013, and 5.1% in 2014 
respectively, suggesting that even for the same group of 
firms, compliance has become more difficult under the 
Top 10,000 Enterprises Program. Table 4 shows the sum‑
mary statistics of industrial firms successfully matched 
to the 2011 CIC data. 
2.3 Possible explanations for 
non‑compliance
Many reasons could explain the higher non‑compli‑
ance rate in the Top 10,000 Enterprises Program. For 
example, fewer inexpensive energy saving technologies, 
lower energy prices (in particular, for coal, as the price 
plunged due to oversupply in the face of slowing demand 
5 The industry section of the China Statistical Yearbook is compiled 
based on this dataset. To our knowledge, the CIC is the most detailed 
database of Chinese industrial firms available. The CIC contains 
detailed information about each company’s identity, address, industry 
classification, year of incorporation, employment, hierarchical level to 
which the company reports (regional, provincial, or town), registra‑
tion type (SOE, collective, stock‑limited, private, Hong Kong/Macau/
Taiwan, or foreign), and production of three main products in order 
of relative importance. The data set also includes information on 
assets, both the year‑end level and the change within the year, own‑
ership rights, contractual and actual investments, sales, profits, and 
exports. In addition, there are detailed records of the breakdown of 
contractual and actual paid‑in capital among the investment sources, 
such as government, private investors or foreign investors. 
Table 1. Numbers of total firms and non‑compliant firms covered by the two programs. 
Top 1,000 Enterprises Program Top 10,000 Enterprises Program
Orig. list Evaluation Orig. list Evaluation
2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014
Total firms 1,008 922 901 881 16,078 14,542 14,119 13,328
Non‑compliant firms ‑ 36 28 15 ‑ 1,377 1,191 948
Non‑compliant rates ‑ 3.9% 3.1% 1.7% ‑ 9.5% 8.4% 7.1% 
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growth since 2012), and tighter scrutiny over self‑re‑
ported performance information could help to explain 
the observed decrease in compliance. Another potential 
explanation is that data manipulation in favor of target 
achievement was much more prevalent during the Top 
1,000 Enterprises Program compared to the Top 10,000 
Enterprises Program. We examine and compare report‑
ed compliance behavior of firms to understand whether 
or not compliance behavior changed substantially with 
the expansion of the program, focusing on the behavior 
in the neighborhood of the target. 
Manipulation in the reporting of environmental data 
in China is a well‑documented phenomenon. Previous 
studies either find huge a disparity in reported values for 
6 We are able to match all the firms in the original list of the Top 1,000 
Firms Enterprises with unique firm ID with the CIC data. However, 
some participating firms have the same firm ID but different firm names, 
either because distinct organizations may belong to the same firm, or 
due to input error. This duplication is discussed further in Section 4. 
the same energy statistics (Guan et al., 2012), and dis‑
cover data manipulation in air quality data by observing 
“bunching” of the PM10 numbers below the “Blue Sky 
Day” threshold (Chen et al., 2013; Ghanem and Zhang, 
2014) using statistical approaches. The “bunching” be‑
havior just below the compliance threshold defined by 
a policy is also observed in other developing countries 
(Duflo et al., 2013). 
In this study, we apply a statistical method from Chen et al. 
(2013) to analyze whether or not firms’ energy saving data 
is “bunched” above the target under the Top 1,000 En‑
terprises Program7. We calculate each firm’s energy sav‑
7 We can only perform this analysis for the Top 1,000 Enterprises 
Program as it provides the energy saving amount by firm in addition 
to their achievement status. For the three evaluations in the Top 
10,000 Enterprises Program, only achievement status – 未完成 (not 
achieved), 基本完成 (almost achieved, 完成 (achieved), or 超额完
成 (over‑achieved) – is available for central SOEs. The energy saving 
level is only provided for non‑compliant firms, therefore we imple‑
ment a similar discontinuity test for this subset of firms later on.
Table 2. Coverage and estimated non‑compliance rates for the Top 10,000 Enterprises Program. 
Orig. list Evaluated in 2012 Evaluated in 2013 Evaluated in 2014
Total 
Firms
Non‑Compliant 
Firms
Non‑Compliance 
Rate (Estimated)
Non‑Compliant 
Firms
Non‑Compliance 
Rate (Estimated)
Non‑Compliant 
Firms
Non‑Compliance 
Rate (Estimated)
Industrial 14,641 1,174 9.0% 1038 8.2% 693 5.8%
Transportation 548 63 11.5% 37 6.8% 28 5.1%
Hotels &  
Restaurants 
195 14 7.2% 13 6.7% 12 6.2% 
Commercial & 
Trade
260 28 10.8% 29 11.2% 41 15.8%
Schools 434 88 20.3% 48 11.1% 21 4.8%
Note: Sectoral information is available only for the original list and non‑compliant firms (numbers in bold in Table 1). 
Table 3. Industrial firms matched using the Top 1,000 and 10,0000 Enterprises Programs data and industrial census data. 
Top 1,000 Enterprises Top 10,000 Enterprises
Orig. list 2008 Evaluation 2009 Evaluation 2010 Evaluation Original list
Industrial firms total 1,008 922 901 881 14,641
Industrial firms matched 1,0016 862 840 824 6,945
Percentage matched 99.3% 93.5% 93.2% 93.5% 47.4%
Table 4. Summary statistics of industrial firms matched to the 2011 CIC data. 
Top 1,000 Enterprises Program
New Entrants in the Top 10,000 
Enterprises Program
Number of firms 412 6533
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Revenue (billion yuan) 6.5 14.5 1.0 5.0
Assets (billion yuan) 3.7 9.3 0.5 2.1
Employees (thousands) 8.7 20.5 1.3 3.9
Age (years) 22.5 19.7 11.4 26.1
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ing achievement in percentage terms (AP) by dividing 
reported cumulative energy saving during the program 
by the energy saving target. If there is data manipulation 
that results in upward revision of the actual energy saving 
number to achieve the target, there must be a disconti‑
nuity of AP around 100%. This discontinuity does not 
necessarily prove data manipulation occurred, because 
firms may strategically achieve the energy saving target 
by a small margin. However, in practice this accurate hit 
is challenging as energy saving is affected both by total 
output in value terms and energy used, which are difficult 
to co‑optimize with a high degree of precision, given that 
output value reflects current prices in the output market 
over which a firm usually has limited to no control. 
The left panel of Figure 1 shows the probability distri‑
bution of AP with the bin width of 2.5%. The frequen‑
cy spikes at the bin for 100–102.5%, where 100% is the 
cut‑off for achievement. We then implement the Burg‑
stahler and Dichev test (BDT) (Burgstahler and Dichev, 
1997) to obtain a more quantitative measure of the sharp‑
ness of the discontinuity. For any bin (j) excluding the 
first and last, the BDT statistics are computed by com‑
paring the bin’s observed probability density (pj) with 
the average of the neighboring probability density (pj–1 
and p^j+1):   (1)
where n  is the total number of observations, and 
  (2)
According to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Takeu‑
chi (1997), BDT j complies with a standard normal distri‑
bution if the true data is continuous. With a bigger sam‑
ple size and narrower bin width, the test is more powerful. 
As discussed in Takeuchi (1997), the test is powerful if 
the sample size is more than 500, and our sample size of 
around 1,000 observations is substantially larger. 
The right panel of Figure 1 shows the result of the BDT 
test. Dashed lines indicate critical values with a confi‑
dence level of 99%. The data shows a significant discon‑
tinuity in the neighborhood of 100%. The results are 
still robust if we increase the bin size to 5% as shown in 
Figure 2. 
For the Top 10,000 Enterprises Program, cumulative en‑
ergy saving data during the Twelfth FYP are only avail‑
able for the non‑compliant firms in 2012, 2013 and 2014. 
Therefore, we use the BDT test to check if there is a dis‑
continuity close to the compliance threshold8 for these 
non‑compliant firms. There should be fewer firms just 
below the threshold among the non‑compliant firms if 
firms’ reported energy savings are “bunched” just above 
the threshold. From Figure A1, A2 and A3, we do not 
observe any discontinuity around these potential thresh‑
olds. Though we cannot rule out the possibility of en‑
ergy saving exaggeration by the Top 10,000 Enterprises 
(Zhao et al., 2016), falsification of target achievement 
seems to have been eliminated. A campaign during the 
Twelfth FYP to crack down on statistical misreporting 
nationwide may also help to explain overall improve‑
ments in the quality of statistical reporting relative to the 
Eleventh FYP.
8 We assume the threshold for compliance, 完成 (completed), is 
40% for 2012, 60% for 2013 and 80% for 2014. 
Figure 1. Probability distribution and the BDT test for energy saving achievement in percentage of firms under the Top 1,000 
Enterprises Program (bin size: 2.5%). 
Achievement in Percentage (bin size: 5) (%)
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
De
ns
ity
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12 (a)
Achievement in Percentage (bin size: 5) (%)
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
BD
T 
St
at
is
tic
s
-20
0
20
40
60 (b)
MIT JOINT PROGRAM ON THE SCIENCE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL CHANGE REPORT 303
7
3. Why Do Firms Fail to Comply in the 
Top 10,000 Enterprises Programs?
In this section, we discuss the self‑reported reasons why 
firms fail to achieve their assigned targets. Starting from 
the evaluation in 2012, some provinces submitted de‑
tailed explanations of the reason(s) for a firm’s non‑com‑
pliance. In 2013 and 2014, more provinces provided this 
information. Here we collect all the information and pro‑
vide a detailed summary. 
3.1 Reasons for non‑compliance
We collect 803 records for non‑compliant firms and cat‑
egorize them in Table 5. Firms report a broad range of 
rationales for non‑compliance. Reasons (1) and (2) were 
most frequently reported. Reports that some firms were 
unwilling to comply with the evaluation reflect the lim‑
its of the program’s administrative reach. Firms that are 
local giants may have had strong bargaining power (Lo‑
rentzen et al., 2014) and did not bother to support the 
program. Many organizations failed to submit complete 
evaluation materials. For example, we find that the Party 
School of the Central Committee of the CPC, which has 
a higher political rank than NDRC, did not provide com‑
plete evaluation materials in 2012. This non‑compliance 
behavior was still made public, suggesting that NDRC is 
pushing the program very seriously, and the government 
does not want to hide non‑compliance behavior. 
Firms that closed, stopped production, merged, or 
changed production were excluded from the evalua‑
tion. Therefore, Reasons (3) to (5) should not be listed 
as reasons for non‑compliance. Though those firms were 
supposed to be exempted, a potential explanation is that 
provincial or subordinate governments had discretion in 
policy implementation within their own borders. Rea‑
son (6) suggests that new program entrants faced more 
compliance difficulty. We also observe that in practice 
provinces behaved very differently when bringing new 
firms into the program. For example, among the firms 
which did not achieve the target, some were not found in 
the original list of the Top 10,000 Enterprises Program, 
suggesting that they were new firms introduced. We find 
new firms from Hunan in 2012, from Shanxi, Jiangxi, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Ningxia in 2013, 
and from Shanxi, Guangdong and Qinghai in 2014. 
Reasons (7) to (15) reflect challenges in the target setting 
and evaluation system design, which have caused uneven 
stringency across firms of different sizes and production 
levels. The energy saving of year t  for a firm, ES _t, is cal‑
culated using production data from the current year Y _t 
times the energy intensity difference between the current 
year t  (EI _t) and the last year t–1 (EI _(t–1) . ES t = Y (t ) *  (EI (t–1 ) –  EI t)  (3)
Reason (7) suggests that firms with low levels of pro‑
duction found it very difficult to achieve the target, even 
though their production was very efficient, because a 
decrease in Y t could translate into an additional require‑
ment in the decrease in energy use per unit of output in 
order to achieve the same amount of energy saving. At 
the same time, a low level of production usually increases 
the energy intensity relative to production at full capac‑
ity, because of fixed energy requirements (e.g. for light‑
ing or air conditioning) and more frequent starts and 
stops. On the contrary, researchers have pointed out that 
many firms just achieved the target by simply expand‑
ing the production with minor technical improvements 
(Zhao et al., 2016). Reason (8) reflects that some sectors 
or firms experienced fluctuating energy intensity, requir‑
ing multiple years to build a stable baseline. Reason (9) 
shows that at least one firm claimed that the market price, 
which firms may not have the power to influence, could 
introduce additional uncertainty into target achievement. 
Figure 2. Probability distributsion and the BDT test for energy saving achievement in percentage of firms under the Top 1,000 
Enterprises Program (bin size: 5%). 
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Table 5. Self‑reported reasons why firms failed to comply with the Top 10,000 Enterprises Program. 
Reasons # Description Cases 
1 Did not 
cooperate
115 Refused to submit self‑checking report, 
energy data, or other required materials. 
Firm IDs 241528447, 701515971 and others refused to submit required materials; 
energy saving was accounted as zero; firms were judged as non‑compliant. 
2 Incomplete 
materials
130 Did not provide the complete materials 
and/or data required by the evaluation. 
Firms with ID 675122727 and 726283353 provided incorrect energy statistics; 
some other firms failed to provide complete materials for evaluation. 
3 Ceased 
production
132 Temporarily or permanently stopped 
entire (or significant part of) production. 
Firm ID 726960908 did not produce in the second half of 2013; firm ID 661156432 
closed & moved, firm ID 677976195 suspended production for technology upgrades. 
4 Merge 13 Merge significantly effected operations. Firms with ID 755233953, 750204408 and others merged with other firms. 
5 Product 
portfolios 
change
26 Firms that added energy‑intensive 
products to their portfolios, or experienced 
certain changes in operations, also 
increased energy intensity. 
Firm ID 727779270 changed product portfolios, resulting in higher energy intensity; 
firms with ID 748535654 and 669788071 changed from cement sintering to cement 
grinding; firm with ID 749347233 had to operate new bus lines; firm IDs 124030607 
and 724873587 built a new pressure station to reach more remote areas of the city. 
6 Lack of 
capacity; new 
to program
28 Firms newly included in the evaluation 
may not have accurate historical data or 
an energy management system, or lack 
capacity to meet targets or complete the 
evaluation. 
Firm with ID 680242352 did not complete energy measurement; firm ID 554125606 
achieved the energy saving target but had a very low energy management score. 
7 Low or 
unstable 
production
161 Production was lower than expected, 
therefore the energy saving linked 
to production was limited. This may 
increase the unit energy consumption of 
the product as more frequent starts and 
stops reduce efficiency of operation. 
Firm with ID 718902097 stopped one fertilizer production line to allow redirection 
of natural gas supply for household use; firm ID 751122279 reported that real estate 
depression & severe competition lowered the cement production; firm ID 744566859 
reported low production due to low gold price; firm ID 775877086 reported low 
polysilicon production due to weak international market. 
8 Uncertain 
energy use 
per unit of 
production
26 Some firms had production process 
with fluctuating energy use, especially 
for some transportation firms. 
Firm IDs 607279837, 769410578 and others reported that unit energy use could vary 
a lot due to vehicle speed change; firm ID 66425867X reported that it only had two 
customers for steam production, and unavoidable adjustments to meet demand limited 
energy savings; firm ID 751122279 reported that the unstable quality of limestone used 
for cement production required more energy to smash; firm ID 684892141 reported more 
energy was consumed to provide heat in 2013 due to lower incoming water temperature.
9 Product 
price 
decrease
5 Decreasing product price decreases 
output value of a firm with same input 
use (therefore energy consumption per 
unit of output value increases). 
Firm with ID 744566859 reported that low gold price increased energy consumption 
per unit of output; firm with ID 741835152 reported product price decreased due to 
the expansion of production capacity. 
10 Ongoing 
or planned 
technology 
upgrading
11 Firms were implementing technology 
upgrades, or had plans to enhance 
energy efficiency in later years during 
the Twelfth FYP. 
Firms with ID 241525481 and 241654021 reported ongoing technology upgrading 
programs; firms with ID 752995776 and 589213438 claimed that they would start 
energy efficiency programs in later years. 
11 Ongoing 
construction
5 Energy use increased due to new 
projects under construction. 
Firms with ID 463158672 and 606551659 were starting new construction projects. 
12 Lower 
heating 
value fuels
5 Switching to a lower heating value fuel 
may increase reported energy use if 
energy use is not correctly converted to 
coal‑equivalent units by measuring the 
heating value change.
Firms with ID 214650738 and 791593438 used coal gangue to generate electricity; 
firm with ID 298980370 reported lower quality of coal. 
13 Little room 
to improve 
efficiency
34 Firms were very efficient already, with 
little room to improve. 
Firms with ID 66427977X and 767861738 reported that energy use per unit of 
product was already very low, and the energy saving target was too high. 
14 Schools 
with more 
buildings
8 School energy targets were linked 
to the number of students, therefore 
constructing new buildings made 
targets harder to achieve if the number 
of students went unchanged. 
Schools with ID 460030008, 460029402 and others constructed new buildings.
15 Poor energy 
management
12 Firms had very low energy 
management scores.
Firms with ID 781030850, 754054152, and others achieved energy saving targets, 
but did not meet energy management requirements. 
16 Other 
“reasons”
98 For example, firms changed their 
names, or firms saved some energy 
but not enough. 
Firm IDs 775071672 and 19804979X changed names; firm ID 604814160, 
751554784, and others reported progress but not compliance; firm ID 791558405 
had higher energy use; firm ID 67732965X and 66425867X had outdated 
equipment; firm ID 578663441 and 128512937 claimed insufficient funds to invest 
in energy efficiency; firm ID 753710840, 718804075 and others claimed to have 
too many light‑duty vehicles; firm ID 681506399 and 767027313 claimed to have 
no independent accounting or decision power; firm ID 753063719 achieved energy 
saving, but had low evaluation scores. 
Note: Some firms had more than one reason for non‑compliance, therefore the numbers do not add up to 803. 
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A decreasing output price makes it harder for firms to 
comply, while an increasing price may allow firms to hit 
the target with no substantive effort. However, Zhao et al. 
(2016) points out that the national standard for energy 
saving auditing requires using a constant price when cal‑
culating energy saving. Therefore, in this case either the 
firm mistakenly used the current price, or the local gov‑
ernment applied the wrong price for evaluation. 
Reason (10) relates to the time flexibility of target 
achievement. To prevent the “Eleventh‑Hour” efforts like 
power rationing implemented by some provinces at the 
end of the Eleventh FYP to achieve compliance with pro‑
vincial energy intensity targets, the Twelfth FYP empha‑
sized the importance of meeting a disaggregated annual 
target. However, this requirement meant that firms had 
limited temporal flexibility to undertake the required 
upgrades. As energy saving from a single technology up‑
grade may exceed the target required for the whole five 
years, and there is no reward from government for early 
achievement, firms may simply implement the upgrades 
after considering opportunity cost, e.g. the potential for 
a decrease in upgrade cost and loss of sales due to the 
suspension of production while the upgrade is made. 
Reasons (11) and (12) suggest that more rigorous ener‑
gy accounting standards are required. It may be defen‑
sible to exclude temporary energy use increases due to 
new construction when calculating energy saving, but in 
principle changing fuel quality should not make compli‑
ance more difficult if the correct heating value is applied 
in the conversion. Some firms may be switching to lower 
cost, lower heating value fuels but do not know how to 
accurately convert to standard ton‑equivalent coal use, 
so they reported this as a reason for non‑compliance. 
However, it should not be a problem if they comply with 
the requirement of energy accounting and build the ca‑
pacity to measure the heat value change correctly. 
Reasons (13) and (14) shed light on one important as‑
pect of the program: how to allocate targets to firms in 
a manner that balances economic efficiency and equi‑
ty considerations. Though the documents for the Top 
10,000 Enterprises Program do not explicitly explain 
how the national 250 million tons of coal‑equivalent en‑
ergy saving target was disaggregated to the firms, previ‑
ous research (Zhao et al., 2014) has suggested that firms’ 
historical energy use played a dominant role in the allo‑
cation process, probably with some (limited) provincial 
or firm‑specific adjustments based on estimated ener‑
gy‑saving potential. 
Therefore, firms that are already at the energy efficiency 
frontier may still face very stringent targets, if they are 
large energy users. Though the idea of “benchmarking” 
was introduced in the document, those firms that re‑
ported that they were already energy efficient were still 
judged as non‑compliers. Another challenge concerns 
under what conditions the target should be adjusted. It 
seems that schools that exceeded their original target 
because they needed to build a new library, stadium, or 
dormitory to provide better educational service were still 
deemed non‑compliant. 
Reason (15) reflects an additional requirement imple‑
mented by the NDRC during the Top 10,000 Enterprises 
Program. Firms that did not meet the energy manage‑
ment requirement were treated as non‑compliers, even if 
they have achieved the energy saving target. This is cru‑
cial because the energy data adopted in the evaluation is 
largely based on firms’ self‑reported data, and observers 
rightly worry about the data quality if no standard en‑
ergy management system is established. Moreover, the 
energy management system itself is designed to mitigate 
inattention to energy saving by raising awareness among 
a firm’s leadership. 
3.2 Firm characteristics associated with 
non‑compliance
Previous research has shown that compliance behavior 
can vary with firm capacity, e.g. economic resources and 
management level (Weaver, 2014), and external environ‑
ment, e.g. deterrent fears of being punished for violation 
(Gunningham et al., 2002), and social pressures from 
the media and citizens (Kagan et al., 2003). Here we ask 
which characteristics are associated with non‑compliance 
in the Top 10,000 Enterprises Program. We speculate that 
firm size, profitability, ownership status, and inclusion in 
the Top 1,000 Enterprises Program may affect compliance. 
These factors are common control variables used in previ‑
ous literature (e.g. Doshi et al., 2013 and Bajo et al., 2009), 
and are also potentially connected to reasons of non‑com‑
pliance listed above. For example, firms that are less prof‑
itable may be more likely to miss the target because of low 
production levels or unstable or limited funds for energy 
saving investment. We apply the logit model to analyze 
the effects of these factors on the firm compliance. Given 
that energy saving targets were imposed and enforced dif‑
ferentially by provinces, and reflected differences in pro‑
duction technology by industry, we include province and 
industry dummies in our regression. 
In Figure 3, we rank provinces according to the non‑com‑
pliance rate in 2012 from high to low. Dashed lines show 
the non‑compliance rate of firms that are matched with 
CIC, which is a subset of all the firms reported by the 
NDRC. Though there are minor discrepancies between 
the two rates, in general they fit pretty well9, suggesting 
that the data set matched with the CIC is able to approxi‑
mate the full data set. The range of non‑compliance rates 
9 Pearson’s correlations are 0.9, 0.8, and 0.7 for 2012, 2013, and 
2014, respectively. 
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across provinces varies widely, especially in 2012, with 
the highest rate above 0.5 and lowest rate of 010. Prov‑
inces with high energy intensity (e.g. Ningxia, Xinjiang, 
Shanxi, and Shaanxi) reported high non‑compliance 
rates; however, surprisingly provinces with the highest 
development levels and low energy intensity (e.g. Beijing, 
Tianjin and Shanghai) also reported high non‑compli‑
ance rates, suggesting firms’ targets are stringent, or local 
government is very strict in the evaluation. Compliance 
rates across different sectors11 also vary, but exhibit a 
much narrower range and higher consistency over the 
three years, as shown in Figure 4. 
We run a logit regression to analyze factors associated 
with non‑compliance, shown in Table 6. The dependent 
variable is a binary variable for non‑compliance. The val‑
ue of the dependent variable is 1 if a firm is non‑compli‑
ant and 0 if a firm is compliant. We use the log of main 
10 We doubt the accuracy of Hubei’s zero non‑compliance in 2012 as 
33 firms are reported non‑compliant in 2013. 
11 We categorize firms into eleven sectors. Nine sectors are indus‑
tries listed in the Top 1,000 Enterprises Program, and the other two 
sectors are other mining industries and other manufacturing indus‑
tries besides those nine sectors. 
business revenue as a proxy for firm size, and profit rate 
(total profit divided by main business revenue) as a proxy 
for profitability. A shareholding status (state, non‑state) 
and authority level (central, provincial, prefectural, 
county) variables are used to define dummies for own‑
ership, and another dummy is included to distinguish 
whether the firm is included in the Top 1,000 Enterprises 
Program or not. 
We find that larger firms are more likely to be non‑com‑
pliant. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis 
tested in Lorentzen et al. (2014) that industrial giants 
may be shielded from the pressure to implement envi‑
ronment standards. This may be especially true for those 
non‑SOEs, which are not obligated by the government to 
report energy saving as part of annual cadre evaluations12. 
Though not significant, firms with lower profitability 
tend to fail to achieve the target as we discussed previous‑
ly. Compared to the non‑state owned firms, SOEs under 
central supervision have slightly lower non‑compliance 
12 In a robustness check we interact the size proxy, i.e. log revenue, 
with SOE dummies, and find the coefficient of size variable still 
significant and positive, but the coefficients of interaction terms are 
significant and negative, which means large SOEs have relatively low 
non‑compliance rates. 
Figure 3. Non‑compliance rate by province for all the firms and firms matched with CIC data in 2012, 2013 and 2014. 
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rate, but local SOEs have slightly higher non‑compliance 
rates. This is consistent with the finding of Lo (2015)’s 
case study on the compliance behavior of the Top 10,000 
enterprises in Changchun City, Jilin Province.
Central SOEs face more pressure from the central gov‑
ernment to achieve the targets. They are also usually bet‑
ter managed and have an “energy office” (or at minimum 
an “energy manager”) in charge of tracking and improv‑
ing energy efficiency, while other firms may not have a 
specific person responsible for energy management. For 
example, it is very common for them to rely on the firm’s 
accountant, who knows very little about energy, to report 
energy use, resulting in substantial misreporting (Kostka, 
2016). Finally, firms that were involved in the Top 1,000 
Enterprises Program have relatively low non‑compliance 
rates, as they may have a well‑established energy man‑
agement system and take the energy saving targets more 
seriously. The expected non‑compliance rate is 4.2% for 
those firms compared to 5.7% for others if all the other 
variables are held at the mean value. 
We further explore if macroeconomic and institutional 
factors matter as previous research has found the local 
political economy can affect environmental policy im‑
plementation in China (Eaton and Kostka, 2014). We 
include per‑capita GDP at the prefecture city level (in 
10,000 yuan) and GDP growth rate in percentage terms 
from 2012 to 2014 in the regression. Cities with higher 
per‑capita GDP may feel increased policy stringency as 
the local cadres put more weight on environmental per‑
formance; however, firms in those cities may have more 
difficulty achieving the target, as they should be cleaner 
and the mitigation cost is higher. Similarly, the expect‑
ed effect of GDP growth rate is also unclear. Cities with 
higher growth rates may emphasize economic develop‑
ment more, and have higher tolerance for non‑compli‑
ance, but firms in those cities may find it easier to achieve 
the target because—as previously explained—expand‑
ing production can make it easier to achieve the target. 
Table 7 shows the regression results. 
Consistent with the latter explanation, we find a highly 
significant and positive coefficient on GDP growth rate. 
We further find evidence that the development level of 
the city where the firm is located does not affect compli‑
ance behavior. 
4. Command‑and‑Control Meets 
Market‑Based Approaches
4.1 Incompatibility
China has recently announced that a national emission 
trading system (ETS) will be started by the end of 2017, 
and the fate of command‑and‑control energy saving 
programs such as the Top 1,000 and 10,000 Enterprises 
Programs remains unclear. These two approaches, which 
impact energy (an emissions trading system would tar‑
Table 6. Factors predicting non‑compliance with the Top 10,000 Enterprises Program. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (main business revenue)  0.04*  0.05**  0.06**  0.08***
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)
Profit rate  ‑0.25  ‑0.26  ‑0.28
 (0.33)  (0.34)  (0.34)
Central SOE  ‑0.21  ‑0.19
 (0.13)  (0.13)
Local SOE  0.06  0.08
 (0.07)  (0.07)
Top 1,000 enterprise  ‑0.33*
 (0.13)
Constant  ‑2.32***  ‑2.34***  ‑2.42***  ‑2.54***
 (0.32)  (0.32)  (0.32)  (0.32)
Province fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Number of years 3 3 3 3
Number of observations 20793 20793 20793 20793
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get only fossil energy), may be incompatible. An ETS en‑
courages flexible target compliance by allowances trading, 
while command‑and‑control programs require a hard 
target for each firm to save energy or reduce emissions 
within a firm’s own fence. We find evidence that this in‑
flexibility has caused some firms that are already very en‑
ergy efficient to fail to achieve the target, consistent with 
the finding in Zhao et al. (2014). Among the reasons that 
explain why firms fail to comply, one given for Datang Jixi 
Thermal Power Company in 2013 is noteworthy: 
“The company’s two 125 MW generation units are al‑
ready the most energy efficient ones compared to oth‑
er units with similar type in China. There is no room to 
improve the energy efficiency, therefore the energy sav‑
ing target is not achieved. In order not to add a negative 
impact on Jixi City’s Twelfth FYP energy saving target, 
Datang Heilongjiang Power Company has negotiated 
with Datang Jixi No.2 Thermal Power Company13, and 
13 Jixi City is a city in Heilongjiang Province, and Datang Heilongji‑
ang Power Company is the parent company of both Datang Jixi Ther‑
mal Power Company and Datang Jixi No.2 Thermal Power Company. 
Datang Jixi No.2 Thermal Power Company is also in the Top 10,000 
Enterprises Program. 
signed an agreement regarding the target sharing of the 
energy saving target during the Twelfth FYP. Datang Jixi 
No.2 Thermal Power Company will carry the 22,000 tons 
of coal equivalent energy saving target for Datang Jixi 
Thermal Power Company. This case has been reported 
to the Jixi Development and Reform Commission for 
approval.” 
This case of spontaneous bilateral energy saving trading 
implies that the stringency across different companies 
could be very different, and the potential opportunity 
for trading to reduce aggregate compliance costs is large. 
Though the implementation plan for the Top 10,000 En‑
terprises Program endorsed the necessity of the energy 
saving trading scheme, Jiangsu Province is the only prov‑
ince which has officially launched energy saving trading 
in 201514. However, firms may be reluctant to participate 
in large‑scale trading programs, given that they feel pres‑
14 Energy saving trading is not limited to the Top 10,000 enterpris‑
es. Besides incentivizing energy saving, one purpose of the policy is 
to allow firms in energy‑intensive sectors that are restricted from 
expanding production capacity to add new installations after buying 
allowances of “energy saving capacity”. 
Table 7. Factors including local economic indicators predicting non‑compliance with the Top 10,000 Enterprises Program. 
(1) (2) (3)
Log (main business revenue) 0.07** 0.07** 0.07**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Profit rate ‑0.44 ‑0.42 ‑0.43
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33)
Central SOE ‑0.17 ‑0.16 ‑0.16
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Local SOE 0.09 0.09 0.09
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Top 1,000 enterprises ‑0.34* ‑0.34* ‑0.34*
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Per‑capita GDP 0.006 0.004
(0.01) (0.01)
GDP growth rate ‑0.03*** ‑0.03***
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant ‑2.67*** ‑2.29*** ‑2.33***
(0.35) (0.35) (0.37)
Province fixed effects YES YES YES
Sector fixed effects YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Number of years 3 3 3
Number of observations 17999 17999 17999
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sure to undertake the reductions within their organiza‑
tion to comply with the Top 10,000 Enterprises Program. 
However, moving to a market system such as an ETS 
could undermine well‑defined administrative mech‑
anisms for achieving compliance, which relies on the 
strong relationship between the government and large, 
often state‑owned enterprises. Many of these enterprises 
were found to overfulfill their targets by a large margin. 
Figure 5 shows the overall energy saving achievement 
rate at the provincial level, defined as the total energy 
savings achieved by all the firms in the province divided 
by the aggregated energy saving target at the provincial 
level, ranked from the lowest to highest. For all three 
years, all the provinces have passed the progress target 
(40%, 60%, and 80% respectively). Surprisingly, in 2013 
about half (15) of the provinces had already achieved 
their Five‑Year energy saving targets. The number of 
provinces increased to 25 by the end of 2014. This sug‑
gests that many firms significantly overfulfill their energy 
saving target, because of either cheap energy saving op‑
portunities or great support/pressure from the govern‑
ment. In other words, in order to achieve the provincial 
target, the provincial government does not necessarily 
push every firm to achieve the individual target—it can 
instead lean on a number of key firms to overfulfill the 
target, raising the total energy saved in the province as a 
whole. For example, Beijing and Shanghai are among the 
provinces with the highest provincial target achievement 
rates; however, they also have high firm non‑compliance 
rates at the same time. This strategy reflects a potential‑
ly rational calculation by the provincial government: as 
energy intensity reduction at the provincial level is the 
primary index that enters the performance evaluation, it 
could be much easier to reduce energy use by leaning 
hard on fewer firms, especially on SOEs with direct gov‑
ernment reporting links. This is confirmed by the fact 
that the overfulfillment rates of central SOEs15 are higher 
than the rates of all the firms in most provinces shown 
in Figure 6. It is worth considering whether government 
enforcement pressure will be as effective if these firms 
have opportunities to purchase reduction credits from 
outside their own boundaries. 
15 We only have detailed achievement status at the firm level for 
central SOEs. 
Figure 5. Overall energy saving achievement rate at the provincial level in 2012, 2013 and 2014. 
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On the other hand, the (over‑)reliance on these limited 
firms also reveals the limited capacity of local govern‑
ment to supervise and motivate a large number of firms 
to save energy, especially after the program was greatly 
expanded during the Twelfth FYP. It is understandable 
that local governments may “wave through” self‑report‑
ed firm‑level energy saving, as they do not want the to‑
tal energy saving in their provinces to fall. At the central 
level, there is no detail available on the scrutiny of the 
energy saving data (i.e. no results of inspection or au‑
diting are published) from more than 10,000 enterprises, 
which is no doubt a very challenging task that requires 
significant investment in monitoring infrastructure and 
personnel training. This prompts a need for independent 
third‑party auditing, which will be essential for the en‑
forcement of energy and environmental policies. This 
third‑party auditing could be coordinated with the de‑
velopment of a national ETS and financed by the gov‑
ernment at the beginning to limit the risk of industry 
capture (Duflo et al., 2013). 
4.2 Lessons for future policy design
The Top 1,000 and 10,000 Enterprises Program pro‑
vides an important common basis for future policies, 
regardless of whether it is command‑and‑control or 
market‑based. First, the large scale of the program has 
successfully drawn enough attention of those company 
executives, who might just simply ignore energy saving 
opportunities, even if their firms are large energy users 
and face highly profitable energy saving opportunities. 
The publication of compliance information further adds 
pressure. Second, the program to some extent addressed 
the financing problem of energy efficiency retrofits. Be‑
yond the aid of the central government, many provin‑
cial governments also initiated similar energy saving 
programs that set firm‑specific targets and provided 
financial aid involving more firms within the province. 
For instance, Shanxi People’s Government launched the 
“Shanxi 1,000 Firms Program” that involves more Shanxi 
firms, including those firms under the national Top 1,000 
Enterprises Program during the 11th FYP (Government 
of Shanxi Province, 2008). Third, data collection mecha‑
nisms required for program effectiveness are now estab‑
lished and being improved. Only with this system fully 
functional is it possible to have targets allocated in line 
with policy objectives, such as equity or cost‑effective‑
ness, and policies ultimately enforced. Finally, NDRC’s 
release of the program’s compliance documents is a pos‑
itive step that increases the transparency of the policy 
and offers a chance to engage public participation in the 
energy saving campaign. Previous studies have found 
that higher public participation, transparency of results, 
and easier access to information could help environmen‑
tal policies achieve improved outcomes (Scruggs, 2003; 
Lipscy, 2011). Transparency also makes it possible for re‑
searchers to conduct quantitative analysis, and provides 
information to policymakers that can use it to improve 
the effectiveness of the program. Besides the findings 
presented above, we also note some minor inconsisten‑
cies and errors in these documents (limited to firms in 
some provinces, see the Appendix for details), and trans‑
parency can help to improve the quality of data reporting. 
Shifting the regulated unit from firm to installation 
could further help to improve the effectiveness of the 
program. Currently, both the Top 10,000 Enterprises 
Program and ETS pilots give firms energy saving tar‑
gets or emissions allowances, different from the EU‑ETS, 
which includes the installation as the unit for compliance. 
We propose moving towards the installation‑level com‑
pliance for several reasons. First, there are many cases 
that the same firm has different names or even different 
IDs, or one firm has various branches (see examples in 
Table A2), which can cause confusion or potential dou‑
ble counting issues. For example, 华新水泥股份有限公
司 (Huaxin Cement Co., Ltd.) appears twice in the 2010 
evaluation of the Top 1,000 Enterprises Program, as it 
has two branches in Hubei; additionally, there are three 
firms with different firm names and IDs16 that are exact‑
ly the same firm covered in the Top 10,000 Enterprises 
Program. Second, target setting at the installation level 
could avoid the need for adjustments when firms merge, 
split or significantly change product portfolios. For ex‑
ample, in the 2010 evaluation of the Top 1,000 Enter‑
prises Program, the energy saving target for 包头钢铁 
（集团）有限责任公司（含包钢联）(Baotou Steel (Group) 
Co., Ltd. (including Baoganglian)) was adjusted from 
755,100 tons to 832,600 tons after it acquired another 
firm 包钢联 (Baoganglian); conversely, the target for 白
银有色集团股份有限公司 (Baiyin Non‑ferrous Metal 
Group Co., Ltd.) in 2009 was shared by two firms 白银
公司 (Baiyin Company) and 甘肃华鹭铝业公司 (Gansu 
Hualu Aluminum Company), which are newly included 
in the Top 1,000 Enterprises Program in 2010. There are 
also many examples of firms that change their sectors or 
production portfolios so their targets have to be adjusted. 
Similarly, issues that cause non‑compliance like ongoing 
construction or having new buildings can be avoided. 
Setting the target on installations can also be helpful for 
benchmarking and online energy/emissions monitoring. 
16 These three firms are 国网能源开发有限公司天津大港发电厂 
(Tianjin Dagang Huashi Power Generation Co., Ltd.; ID: 803060357), 
天津大港华实发电有限责任公司 (Tianjin Dagang Huashi Power 
Generation Co., Ltd.; ID: 735474880), and 天津大港广安津能发电
有限责任公司 (Tianjin Dagang Guang'an Jinneng Power Generation 
Co., Ltd.; ID: 718258879). 
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5. Conclusion
Those who are familiar with Chinese central‑local rela‑
tions and environmental governance often quote the fa‑
mous Chinese proverb that “the mountains are high and 
the emperor is far away,” but finding strong evidence of 
local shirking of central directives is usually not easy. The 
detailed records released for the Top 1,000 and 10,000 
Enterprises Program provide us with a unique opportu‑
nity to study non‑compliance behavior in firms. We find 
evidence of the potential and limits of industrial energy 
conservation programs in China, which offers lessons for 
future adjustments as well as for programs design in oth‑
er emerging markets. 
The fact that non‑compliance significantly increased 
from the Top 1,000 to the Top 10,000 Enterprises Pro‑
gram suggests that further expansion of the program 
could exacerbate compliance challenges. The increase in 
the non‑compliance rate seems to reflect, at least in part, 
the increasing diversity of firms in the expanded pro‑
gram. Indeed, the Top 1,000 Enterprises Program was 
predominantly state‑owned firms that faced significant 
pressure to report, if not actually achieve, compliance. 
In the Top 10,000 Enterprises Program, firms that were 
larger, new program entrants, and firms in cities with low 
growth tended to fail to comply, consistent with a story 
in which the state’s span of control over covered firms 
during the Top 1,000 Enterprises Program was diluted by 
a weaker span of control and local resource constraints 
once the program was expanded. 
Our analysis also identifies gaps in program adminis‑
tration that future iterations could usefully address. The 
first is to shift the regulated unit targeted from firm to 
installation. Currently, both the Top 10,000 Enterprises 
Program and ETS pilots give firms energy saving targets 
or emissions allowances, which is a fundamental differ‑
ence compared to the EU‑ETS, which focuses on the in‑
stallation as the unit for compliance. Evaluating compli‑
ance at the installation level is attractive because: a) we 
found many cases in which the same firm has different 
names or even different IDs, or one firm has different 
branches, which can cause confusion or potential double 
counting issues; b) target setting at the installation level 
could avoid the need for adjustments when firms merge, 
split, significantly change product portfolios, or ongo‑
ing construction, which frequently occurred during the 
2006–2015 period. We also note that although we do not 
find evidence of intentional data manipulation under the 
Top 10,000 Enterprises Program in the Twelfth FYP, we 
cannot prove that it is not occurring. Future programs 
could benefit from stronger auditing and third‑party ver‑
ification, which is currently required for firms included 
in China’s future national emissions trading system. 
We note the potential for incompatibilities to arise be‑
tween the national emission trading system (ETS) 
proposed to start in 2017 and energy conservation 
programs such as the Top 1,000 and Top 10,000 Enter‑
prises Programs, which follow the command‑and‑con‑
trol approach. If they coexist, these programs will likely 
target many of the same firms. The large and growing 
non‑compliance rate observed in China’s energy conser‑
vation programs suggests that the rigidity of the program 
has resulted in some already very energy efficient firms 
failing to achieve the target, while at the other extreme, 
there are firms that surpass their energy saving targets by 
a large margin. A potential reason for this phenomenon 
is that provincial governments lean hard on firms over 
which they have direct control to deliver the balance of 
the provincial contribution to the national aggregate en‑
ergy intensity reduction target, making up for the short‑
fall among those firms that for technical or other reasons 
do not fulfill their targets. Indeed, the fact that central 
SOEs report the higher rate of over‑achievement lends 
support to the argument that it is politically much easier 
to reduce energy use by targeting a few key firms, espe‑
cially SOEs. Overlaying a market system would require 
a heavy lift in setting up new institutions, e.g. well‑func‑
tioning third‑party auditing and exchange markets, and 
efficient operation would require refraining from using 
government channels of influence that have proven effec‑
tive in soliciting compliance under command‑and‑con‑
trol programs. 
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Appendix
Table A1. Comparison between the “Top 1,000 Enterprises” and “Top 10,000 Enterprises” Programs.
Top 1,000 Enterprises Top 10,000 Enterprises Note
Policy 
document
NDRC (Resources 
Conservation and Environment 
Protection) [2006] No. 571 (April 
7th, 2006)
NDRC (Resources Conservation and 
Environment Protection) [2011] No. 2873 
(December 7th, 2011)
The documents are issued by 
the same government agency, 
therefore two programs have 
the same legal power.
Ministries 
involved
Five: NDRC, National Energy 
Administration (NEA), National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 
General Administration of 
Quality Supervision, Inspection 
and Quarantine (AQSIQ), and 
State‑owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission 
(SASAC)
Twelve: NDRC, Ministry of Education (MOE), 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
(MIIT), Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry 
of Housing and Urban‑Rural Development 
(MOHURD), Ministry of Transport (MOT), 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), State‑owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC), General Administration of 
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
(AQSIQ), National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), 
and National Energy Administration (NEA) 
More ministries are involved 
as competent authorities in 
the Top 10,000 Enterprises 
Program as more sectors are 
covered. MOF and CBRC are 
involved in introducing more 
financial policies to incentivize 
the firms.
Document 
summary
The full text (4,011 characters 
in total) is divided into five 
sections: Significance, Guiding 
ideology and objectives, Task 
requirement (6 articles), Tracking 
and evaluation (6 articles), and 
Supporting measures (7 articles).
The full text (5,212 characters in total) is divided 
into five sections: Scope of the program, Guiding 
ideology, basic principles and objectives, Task 
requirement (10 articles), Responsibility of 
relevant ministries (6 articles), and Supporting 
measures (6 articles).
Similar structure. The Top 
10,000 Enterprises Program 
has more detailed task 
requirement, more clear 
responsibility of each ministry 
involved, and stronger 
supporting measures.
Role in the 
energy 
saving
The Top 1,000 Enterprises 
Program achieved about 25% 
of total national energy saving 
during the Eleventh FYP.
The Top 10,000 Enterprises Program is targeted 
at achieving about 37% of total national energy 
saving during the Twelfth FYP.
Both programs are core 
elements of the national 
energy saving policy. The role 
of the Top 10,000 Enterprises 
Program is more critical.
Sector 
coverage & 
threshold
Firms with energy consumption 
higher than 180,000 tons of 
coal equivalent in 2004 in 
the nine sectors: coal, textile, 
paper, chemical, petroleum 
and petrochemicals, building 
materials, steel, non‑ferrous 
metal, and power and heat
Industrial firms with energy consumption higher 
than 10,000 tons of coal equivalent in 2010, 
transportation firms that consume more than 
10,000 tons of coal equivalent energy in 2010, 
or have more than 600 vehicles, or higher 
than 50 million tons throughput, and hotels, 
restaurants, commercial and trade enterprises, 
and schools that consume more than 5,000 tons 
of coal equivalent energy in 2010, or hotels and 
restaurants that have a business area larger 
than 80,000 square meters, or commercial and 
trade enterprises that have a business area 
larger than 50,000 square meters, or schools 
that have more than 10,000 students.
The Top 1,000 Enterprises 
Program only includes 
energy‑intensive industries, 
while the Top 10,000 
Enterprises Program expands 
the coverage to almost all the 
sectors. The threshold to be 
included in the program has 
also been significantly lowered.
New practices in the Top 10,000 Enterprises Program
Energy 
management
In the pilot regions for Certified Energy Manager, the person in charge of energy management in the firms should 
acquire Energy Manager Certificate from the government. Firms should follow the national standard “Requirements 
on the energy management system” (GB/T23331) to establish energy management systems.
Energy 
measurement
Firms should strive to achieve the online collection and online reporting of energy use data, and keep a 
comprehensive record of energy consumption.
Retrofit Firms should cooperate with energy service company (ESCO) to implement energy saving retrofits via energy 
performance contracting (EPC).
Benchmarking Firms should satisfy the national standards of unit energy consumption for their products. Local standards should 
also be satisfied if they exist. Stricter local standards should be encouraged.
Trading Explore the possibility to establish the energy saving trading scheme.
Financing CBRC should urge banks to provide credit support to firms’ energy saving projects, and limit lending to firms which 
are far behind the target. Banks should include “green credit” in the performance evaluation of their executives.
Oversight Energy saving supervision agencies at all levels should organize special inspection on firms’ energy saving 
management, energy saving evaluation of fixed assets investment, benchmarking of energy standards, elimination of 
backward equipment, and implementation of their energy saving plans.
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A1. Inconsistencies and errors in the documents of the two programs
It is entirely understandable that inconsistencies and errors could happen in the program with 
this size and coverage. We include some minor ones that we find just to give a flavor that engag‑
ing the academia and public can help to improve the implementation of the program. 
In the Top 1,000 Enterprises Program, there are multiple firms with identical firm ID in the 
original list shown in Table A2.
In the Top 1,000 Enterprises Program, 安徽省六安市建来化工有限公司 (Anhui Lu'an Jianlai 
Chemical Co., Ltd.) appeared in the 2008 evaluation list and did not appear in the 2009 list, but 
it was not included in the list of firms that closed, stopped production, merged, or changed 
production significantly in 2009. 中化平原化工有 限公司（原山东德齐龙化工集团有限公
司） (Sinochem Pingyuan Chemical Co., Ltd., formerly Shandong Deqilong Chemical Co., Ltd.), 
延边晨鸣纸业有限公司 (Yanbian Chenming Paper Co., Ltd.), 唐山市清泉钢铁有限 责任公
司 (Tangshan Qingquan Steel Co., Ltd.), and 唐山市德龙钢铁有限公司（原唐山恒安实业有
限公司）(Tangshan Delong Steel Co., Ltd., formerly Tangshan Heng'an Co., Ltd.) appeared in 
the 2009 and 2010 list, but did not appear either in 2008 list or the original list. The energy 
saving target for 浙江江山虎球水泥有限公司 (Zhejiang Jiangshan Huqiu Cement Co., Ltd.) 
was adjusted from 124,800 tons of coal equivalent to 21,100 tons of coal equivalent without 
explanation. 
In the Top 10,000 Enterprises Program, some firms have inconsistent ID in the original firm list 
and non‑compliant firm list in later years. Though some firms may change their ID, there is also 
clear evidence of typo for some other firms shown in Table A3. 
In the Top 10,000 Enterprises Program, provinces seem to adopt very different rules when in‑
cluding non‑industrial firms in the program. For example, Liaoning, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, 
Henan, Guangxi and Guizhou did not include any hotels and restaurants, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, 
Shandong and Henan did not include any commercial and trade enterprises. Xinjiang only in‑
cluded industrial firms and schools, and Tibet and Qinghai only included industrial firms. 
17 We believe the correct Firm ID for 710926094 should be OS0482771.
Table A2. Firms with the same ID in the original list of the Top 1,000 Enterprises Program. 
Firm ID Firm name 1 Firm name 2
110391196 大同水泥股份有限公司 Datong Cement Co., Ltd.
大同水泥集团有限公司 
Datong Cement Co., Ltd.
169951928 中国石化工股份有限公司河南油田分公司 Sinopec Henan Oilfield Company
中国石化集团河南石油勘探局 
Sinopec Henan Oilfield Survey
220603110 西安热电有限责任公司 Xi'an Thermal Power Co., Ltd.
西安西化热点化工有限责任公司 
Xi'an Xihua Thermal Power Chemical Co., Ltd.
614410741 河南豫港集团公司 Henan Yugang Group
豫港(济源)焦化有限公司 
Yugang (Jiyuan) Coking Co., Ltd.
701755932 凌源钢铁股份有限公司 Lingyuan Steel Co., Ltd.
凌源钢铁集团有限责任公司 
Lingyuan Steel Group Co., Ltd.
71009796X 长庆石油勘探局 Changqing Oil Survey
长庆油田公司 
Changqing Oil Company
710926094 中国石油化工股份有限公司巴陵分公司 Sinopec Baling Company
中国石油化工股份有限公司济南分公司17 
Sinopec Jinan Company
723856718 中国石化胜利油田有限公司 Sinopec Shengli Oilfield Co., Ltd.
胜利油田有限公司 
Shengli Oilfield Co., Ltd.
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Table A3. Firms with ID changed in the original list and non‑compliance list for later years of the Top 10,000 Enterprises Program. 
Firm Name Firm ID in Original List Firm ID in Non‑Compliance List
山西东方资源发展有限公司 
Shanxi Dongfang Resource Development Co., Ltd. 736327516 736322516
青海宜化化工有限责任公司 
Qinghai Yihua Chemical Co., Ltd. 619175011 679175017
杨凌职业技术学院 
Yanglin Vocational Technical Institute 437096960 437096930
太原晋阳发电有限公司 
Taiyuan Jinyang Power Co., Ltd. 71980929X 91980929X
察右前旗泰康铁合金有限公司 
Chayouqian Banner Taikang Ferroalloy Co., Ltd. 116782525 116782825
朝阳东鑫有色金属有限公司 
Chaoyang Dongxin Nonferrous Metal Co., Ltd. 76833506X 37683506X
珲春市天盛墙体材料有限责任公司 
Huichun Tiansheng Wall Materials Co., Ltd. 788722805 778722805
西安邮电学院 
Xi'an Institute of Post and Telecommunications 437205106 437205105
丰镇市南山铁合金有限责任公司 
Fengzhen Nanshan Ferroalloy Co., Ltd. 752564239 757564239
文水县振兴化肥有限公司 
Wenshui Zhenxing Fertilizer Co., Ltd. 70112484X 701724848
海南金红叶纸业有限公司 
Hainan Jinhongye Paper Co., Ltd. 774286544 774286524
长治市晋鑫煤焦有限责任公司 
Changzhi Jinxin Coking Co., Ltd. 602309427 608309427
杭州华胜纸业有限公司 
Hangzhou Huasheng Paper Co., Ltd. 747185138 745081853
海南海峡航运股份有限公司 
Hainan Haixia Shipping Co., Ltd. 742989256 742589256
宁波大学 
Ningbo University 419529106 419529016
喀左康泰热力有限公司 
Kazuo Kangtai Thermal Power Co., Ltd. 768301594 768305194
营口BL矿业有限公司 
Yingkou BL Mining Co., Ltd. 726866225 726886225
北京理工大学珠海学院 
Beijing Institute of Technology, Zhuhai College 762900857 762900859
平利县光大特种硅业有限公司（陕西） 
Pingli Guangda Special Silicon Co., Ltd. (Shaanxi) 766305369 776305369
内蒙古双赢化工有限公司 
Inner Mongolia Shuangying Chemical Co., Ltd. 752559536 752959536
宝兴县大渔溪电冶有限公司 
Baoxing Dayuxi Electrometallurgy Co., Ltd. 75662020X 75662052X
韩城韩禹建材矿业有限责任公司 
Hancheng Hanyu Building Materials Co., Ltd. 709971920 909971920
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Figure A1. Probability distribution and the BDT test for energy saving achievement in percentage of non‑compliant firms under the 
Top 10,000 Enterprises Program in 2012.
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Figure A2. Probability distribution and the BDT test for energy saving achievement in percentage of non‑compliant firms under the 
Top 10,000 Enterprises Program in 2013. 
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Figure A3. Probability distribution and the BDT test for energy saving achievement in percentage of non‑compliant firms under the 
Top 10,000 Enterprises Program in 2014. 
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